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BULWARK OF EQUALITY: THE JURY IN AMERICA
Nino C. Monea
ABSTRACT
Many decry the state of societal inequality in modern America. Juries
are not normally thought of as part of the solution, but history shows that they
should be. It reveals that juries oftentimes advanced the interests of the poor and
lowly when no one else would. It also reveals that powerful interests—
government and corporate—have sought to disempower juries that rule in favor
of marginalized groups.
This Article examines four contexts throughout our history where juries
have enhanced societal equality. (1) In early America, they resisted the British
government and in the nascent republic were friends to debtors and farmers. (2)
When Congress passed fugitive slave laws to enable slaveholders to haul
accused runaways back into bondage, Northern juries effectively invalidated the
laws. (3) During the Industrial Revolution and railroad boom, juries acted as a
check on land seizures and compensated victims of grievous industrial injuries.
And (4) throughout the labor movements of the last two centuries, juries tended
to support workers agitating for better wages and conditions.
Each time, those in power fought back by trying to eliminate or weaken
juries in response. And each time, courts or legislatures brought juries to heel.
Still, history teaches us the valuable role juries play in creating a more equal
society.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent events have thrown societal inequality into sharp relief. Income
inequality has risen in the United States over the past several decades.1 An
ever-growing share of national wealth is being concentrated in the top 1% and
top 0.1%.2 These are people who earn more in one week or half-day,
respectively, than someone in the bottom 90% earns in a year.3 The Great
Recession hurt everyone, but the least among us suffered the greatest losses.4
And when the economy began to creep back, the rich grabbed the largest slice of
the pie on the way up.5 Beyond income inequality, the poor are locked out of the

1

See Claudia Goldin & Lawrence Katz, The Future of Inequality: The Other Reason
Education Matters So Much, MILKEN INST. REV. 1, 1 (3d Quarter 2009); see also Maurice E.
Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 525–26 (2009).
2
Lawrence H. Summers, The Inequality Puzzle, DEMOCRACYJOURNAL.ORG (2014) (reviewing
THOMAS
PIKETTY,
CAPITAL
IN
THE
TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
(2014)),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/33/the-inequality-puzzle/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
3

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 4 (2012).
See generally Fabian T. Pfeffer et al., Wealth Disparities Before and After the Great
Recession, 650 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (2013).
5
Ben Casselman, Feel That Post-Recession Bounce? The Rich Feel It the Most, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/economy/wealth-inequalitystudy.html.
4
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justice system,6 experience worse health outcomes,7 and struggle in school as the
educational achievement gap between rich and poor widens.8
There is no single, unified theory to explain the rise of inequality, but
many have been suggested. Some point to technological growth outpacing
educational attainment.9 Others have argued that it is the confluence of
information technology, international trade, and the decline in unionization.10 To
combat it, political leaders have put forth ideas such as bolstering unions, debt
relief for students, and raising wages, to name but a few. Laws could easily
address each of these topics, but so too could a less obvious method:
strengthening juries.
This Article examines how, throughout American history, juries have
contributed to societal equality and how those in power have worked to subvert
them. I speak not only in abstract terms of liberty and justice, but in concrete
ones: They helped invigorate the American Revolution, protect debtors,
undermine the slave trade, compensate victims of industrial accidents, and
empower unions.
The argument is not that juries always rule the right way. Prejudiced
Southern juries, for example, perpetuated grave injustice to black litigants. The
argument is narrower: On balance and throughout history, juries have helped
marginalized groups, and each time those in power—be they governmental or
corporate actors—have tried to stop them. Repeatedly, juries were curtailed only
after they displeased the political, judicial, or economic elite. It is telling that
those in power believed they can advance their interests more effectively without
interference by democratic institutions such as juries.
Even the shameful verdicts that were based on racial animus should not
disqualify juries as a system overall. First, these juries were operating in
rampantly unjust and prejudiced communities.11 It was not as if the judges, law
6

See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
(2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.
7

Dan Simon, Poverty Fact Sheet: Poor and in Poor Health, INST. FOR RES. ON POVERTY
(2013), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/factsheets/pdfs/PoorInPoorHealth.pdf.
8

Sabrina Tavernise, Education Gap Grows Between Rich and Poor, Studies Say, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/education/education-gap-grows-betweenrich-and-poor-studies-show.html.
9
Goldin & Katz, supra note 1, at 3.
10

Walter Frick, Understanding the Debate Over Inequality, Skills, and the Rise of the 1%,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/understanding-the-debate-overinequality-skills-and-the-rise-of-the-1.
11
The very notion of black citizens serving on juries was decried by voices throughout the
South. See, e.g., The Prejudice of Color, WKLY. SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 1867, at 1,
https://www.newspapers.com/image/58183938/; Miscellaneous Items, MORNING OREGONIAN,
Aug. 7, 1867, at 4, https://www.newspapers.com/image/9638120/; Negro Jurors, GALVESTON
DAILY NEWS, May 3, 1867, at 2, https://www.newspapers.com/image/23964761/.
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enforcement, local politicians, or prosecutors were any more enlightened. Law
enforcement usually did not even bother to prosecute whites who victimized
blacks, and if they did, prosecutors only made half-hearted efforts to try the
case.12
And there is no reason to think judges would have ruled any differently.
Plenty of judges who expressed personal support for abolition ended up
rendering proslavery decisions.13 During the civil rights movement, when the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”)
sought an injunction to block Mississippi’s Jim Crow laws, for instance, judge
after judge turned them down.14 A Georgia judge ordered county officials to
resist voting rights laws even if armed federal forces demanded it.15 And so forth.
Second, the Sixth Amendment demands an impartial jury, not just any
jury at all.16 All-white juries were not representative cross samples of the
community, plain and simple. Patrick Henry called the impartiality of the jury as
valuable as the trial by jury itself, and he was right.17 Biased jurors make a
mockery of the right to trial by jury. But when black jurors were fairly seated
during the Reconstructions, integrated juries convicted hundreds of Klansmen.18
Third, structurally, juries are more likely than any other common
decision maker to reach a fair verdict. Research suggests that professional judges
have the same biases and prejudices as the lay juror.19 Not only that, but because
juries bring with them diverse perspectives, they are better suited to combat
stereotypes.20 This stands to reason because a jury collectively has 500 years of
human experience and a combined I.Q. equal to that of eight Rhodes scholars.21
Southern civil juries in some cases awarded large verdicts against the same

12

RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 256 (2003).

13

Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 350, 350 (1976) (book review).
14

Louis Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in Nullification, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1180–81 (1963).
15
16

ROBERT CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 1002 (2002).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

17

VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 37 (1986). Thomas Jefferson made a
similar point. See Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801) (speaking of the
importance of “trial by juries impartially selected” (emphasis added)).
18
James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 925–26
(2004).
19
Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal Trial Jury: Erosion of Jury Power, 5 HOW. SCROLL SOC.
JUST. L. REV. 1, 57 (2002).
20
JONAKAIT, supra note 12, at 47; Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1292, 1295 (2000).
21
J. KENDALL FEW, AM. JURY TRIAL FOUND., IN DEFENSE OF TRIAL BY JURY 85 (1993).
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Klansmen who were acquitted by earlier criminal juries.22 And unlike virtually
every other governmental institution, challenges can be brought to ensure that
juries are racially balanced.23 Juries are not perfect, but from a design standpoint,
they are more likely to reach a fair result than any other method of adjudication
yet tried.24
And fourth, as this Article later illustrates, black litigants argued for jury
rights to enhance, not degrade, the odds of a just result under the Fugitive Slave
Act.
This Article proceeds in six Parts. Part I gives an overview of the history
of the jury and explains its foundational role in structuring our government. It
traces juries from the dusty banks of the Nile River four thousand years ago to
their exalted role at the founding to their modern fall from grace. It also shows
how juries operationalize and guard most other rights.
Part II explores juries in early America and how they inspired the
founders, nourished the Revolution, ensconced freedom of speech, and protected
citizens from unreasonable searches. From the very beginning, juries were also
seen as necessary to counterbalance wealthy interests in society and they gave
Federalists and Democratic-Republicans cause to break bread. It also shows the
prominent role juries played in the ratification debates over the Constitution,
mainly over how they were necessary to protect local debtors against faraway
creditors. Although most politicians swore allegiance to jury rights, legislatures
quickly started passing laws to erode jury rights, typically to make it easier for
businesses or governments to collect debts and taxes.
Part III looks at how Northern juries blocked slaveholders from winning
suits regarding the capture of persons accused of being runaway slaves. Later,
Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act, which allowed slaveholders to bypass
juries. The law allowed judges, and later commissioners, instead of juries to
decide cases. Parties were sometimes successful at getting courts to invalidate
laws that took away jury rights, and abolitionists saw juries as a key piece of the
fight against slavery. The Supreme Court upheld the law, however, and Southern

22

JOANNE DOROSHOW, CTR. FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW, THE CASE FOR THE CIVIL JURY:
SAFEGUARDING A PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY 20–21 (1992).
23

See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
For a sample of research showing the effectiveness of juries, see BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN &
EDIE GREENE, THE JURY UNDER FIRE: MYTH, CONTROVERSY, AND REFORM 15 (2017); Michael J.
Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 10 (1997); Stan V. Smith, Why Juries Can Be Trusted, 5 VOIR DIRE 19 (1998);
Neil Vidmar, Juries, Judges, and Civil Justice, in THE JURY AS FACT FINDER AND COMMUNITY
PRESENCE IN CIVIL JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE 2001 FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES 8,
10 (2001).
24
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outrage over how juries had thwarted the recapture of accused slaves helped push
the South to secede.
Part IV uses railroads as a prime example of how the Industrial
Revolution expanded the power of judges at the expense of juries. Legislatures
and courts were worried that juries were biased against big business, and would
stifle commerce by ruling against it. To prevent this perceived problem, some
states took juries out of the eminent domain process, allowing railroads to expand
at an alarming clip. And at the prompting of a coalition of businesses, courts
aggressively employed new doctrines like the directed verdict, contributory
negligence, and fellow servant rule to deny relief to victims and families who
were terribly injured by new industrial technology.
Part V focuses on labor injunctions. Starting in the 19th century and
continuing into the 20th, workers around the country began to unionize and
agitate for better pay and conditions. Governments and businesses first tried
criminal prosecutions against workers, but juries typically sided with the
workers. In response, courts started issuing injunctions—which do not require a
jury trial—to block protest, boycotts, and even criticism of industries. Despite
some legislative attempts to narrow labor injunctions, they were never done
away with.
Part VI pushes back against widespread criticism from corporate and
academic circles to argue that America should embrace juries once again. For
whatever flaws they might have, they are the most democratic means we have to
adjudicate issues, and they have demonstrated history of standing up for the
powerless.
II. THE JURY SYSTEM
This Part charts the long and illustrious history of juries in western
civilization. They are many thousands of years old and were used by virtually
every society that had a justice system. In America, juries were once held dear
by all parties and regions. What is more, they served as the mortar for the
Constitution. They gave life to many other rights guaranteed under the great
charter.
A. History of Juries Throughout the World and United States
There is no consensus in the literature on the origin of the jury. Most
agree the modern jury flows from the laws of Henry II (1154–1189 A.D.), but
go any further back and it gets dicey. Some scholars will tell you it all began in
ancient Greece with the laws of Solon.25 Others will swear it was Louis the Pious,

25

Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 377, 391 (1996).
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son of Charlemagne.26 The earliest venture is the Egyptian Kenbet in 2000 B.C.,
an adjudicative body with eight members—four from either side of the Nile.27
Five hundred years later, the Bible tells us that God commanded Moses to deploy
spies to Canaan to survey the land, assess the number of people, and gauge their
strength.28 Obedient as always, Moses picked 12 men, and after 40 days, they
reported back tidings of milk and honey.29 We would hardly consider this a jury
today, but it was a group of 12 selected to gather facts, deliberate, and give
recommendations on whether to attack or retreat. In that way, Moses’s spies bear
more than a passing resemblance to the juries of antiquity, where jurors pounded
the pavement to investigate the case themselves rather than passively absorbing
evidence in court.30
Sir William Holdsworth was probably closest to the mark when he said:
“[T]here may be more than one possible origin for the jury.”31 William Forsyth
argued they arose “silently and gradually” of their own accord rather than from
any one lawmaker.32 This makes sense. Virtually every culture seems to have
adopted something like a jury at some point or another, from the Jewish
Sanhedrin to the Greek dicast to the Frankish Inquest.33 Zimbabwe uses farmers’
juries to allow ordinary citizens to hash out policy disputes.34 Even the gods of
ancient Greece used a jury to try Ares when he was accused of killing Poseidon’s
son.35 To amend an observation from Alexis de Tocqueville, the jury is the only
judicial institution which is so perfectly natural that wherever a number of men
are collected it seems to constitute itself.36
Although the exact origin of juries remains murky, we do know that,
however long they have been around, concentrated powers have opposed them.
Ancient Rome used juries for a time but ended them “apparently because it was
too democratic for the tastes of the increasingly despotic emperors” around 500
A.D.37 Swedish jury trials were once praised as the “bulwark of northern liberty,”
but once they fell into disuse, “the liberties of the [Swedish] commons [were]
26

Megan Healy McClung, A Brief History of the Jury, CBA REC., Feb./Mar. 2005, at 36.
Trial by Jury: “Inherent and Invaluable,” W. VA. ASS’N FOR JUST.,
https://www.wvaj.org/index.cfm?pg=HistoryTrialbyJury (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
28
Numbers 13.
27

29
30
31
32

Id.
McClung, supra note 26, at 37.
WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 313 (1922).
WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 1 (1875).

33

Jack Pope, The Jury, 39 TEX. L. REV. 426, 427–29 (1961).
STUART A. COUPE ET AL., A FARMERS’ JURY: THE FUTURE OF SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE
IN ZIMBABWE 7 (2005).
35
LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 1 n.* (2d ed. 1988).
34

36
37

Cf. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 101 (1835).
Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1414 (1997).
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extinguished, and the government . . . degenerated into a mere aristocracy.”38
Henry VII created the Star Chamber as an alternative to juries. It was held in
secret, with no indictment, no witnesses, and no appeals.39 For centuries
afterward, kings prosecuting treason preferred to use faux trials before judges
who doubled as prosecutors or to have the legislature pass a bill of attainder
rather than roll the dice with a jury.40 Oppressive governments have sought to
abolish juries.41 Executives, legislators, and judges today are, at best, ambivalent
about juries and often hostile toward them.42 And commercial interests have tried
to weaken them.43
In America, no other right has fallen from such a vaunted height to such
lowly obscurity as the jury. It is no exaggeration to call juries the premier right
in early America. The Pilgrims had barely found their land legs at Plymouth
Rock when they declared in 1623 that all criminal cases should be tried by
juries—the very first ordinance they adopted in the New World.44 At the time of
the Constitutional Convention, criminal jury trials were the only right guaranteed
by every state constitution.45 Few protected certain rights that we now consider
fundamental, such as freedom of speech.46 One struggles to find a single
luminary in the early Republic that did not heap fulsome praise upon the
institution.47 Congress impeached a Supreme Court justice because he stripped
powers from juries.48 The South Carolina General Assembly declared in 1751
that “any person who shall endeavor to deprive us of so glorious a privilege as
trials by juries is an enemy to this province.”49

38

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *381; see also PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:
THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, at 111 (2010) (explaining that delegate
William Findley at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention said when Sweden abandoned jury trials
“the commons of that nation lost their freedom” and “tyrannical aristocracy” took over).
39
Trial by Jury: “Inherent and Invaluable,” supra note 27.
40
41

GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC: READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 62 (2013).
MOORE, supra note 35, at 116–19.

42

William G. Young, In Celebration of the American Jury Trial, Address at Massachusetts
Continuing Legal Education, Inc. 7 (Oct. 2, 2014) (transcript available online at
https://www.massbar.org/docs/default-source/publications-document-library/ejournal/201516/in-celebration-of-the-american-jury-trial.pdf?sfvrsn=2).
43

Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 579, 605 (1993).
44

Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 609 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 870 (1994).
46
MICHAEL KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 580 (2016).
47
FEW, supra note 21, at 6.
45

48
49

Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 45, at 908.
DOROSHOW, supra note 22, at second unnumbered page.
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This soaring rhetoric matched reality, for juries undergird our entire
system of government. Most clearly, Article III guarantees that the trial of all
crimes, except impeachment, shall be by jury.50 In the Bill of Rights, juries are
expressly mentioned in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Amendments—respectively
guaranteeing the rights to an indictment by grand jury, a public trial by an
impartial, local jury, and a civil jury.51 Indeed, juries are mentioned more often
than any other right.
Today, the institution of the jury is more likely to be lamented than
lauded. In recent times, both a Chief Justice of the United States52 and a Vice
President of the United States have critiqued it.53 South Carolina’s legislature
reneged on its solemn vow, recently enacting a law to erode the powers of
juries.54 Through the incorporation doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied
federal rights to the states—except for jury rights. With the recent incorporation
of the Second Amendment,55 the jury and grand jury rights remain as the most
prominent rights yet unincorporated.56
Today, some of the greatest critics of juries are politicians, legislators,
the media, and special interest groups.57 For example, the American Medical
Association and the Council of Engineering Companies have funded an anti-jury
front group, and a review of 246 media stories on litigation found they
overrepresented controversial forms of litigation and overinflated plaintiff win
rates and damage amounts, giving a distorted view of juries.58 Attacks on juries
tend to be based on anecdotes, misuse of statistics, and appeals to authority or
“common sense.”59 Plenty of others lack citations, assuming, without supporting,
the premise that judges are bred of a superior mental stock.60 However, because

50

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.

51

U.S. CONST. amends. V–VII.
Warren E. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LOY. L. REV. 205, 210 (1985).

52
53

Aviva Freudmann, Quayle Urges Reforms in Civil Court System, JOC.COM (Aug. 13, 1991,
8:00 PM), https://www.joc.com/quayle-urges-reforms-civil-court-system_19910813.html.
54

Brian A. Comer, South Carolina's Tort Reform Statute Became Effective January 1, 2012,
S.C.
PRODS.
LIABILITY
L.
BLOG
(Feb.
9,
2012,
8:59
AM),
http://scproductsliabilitylaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/south-carolinas-tort-reform-statute.html.
55
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
56

EDWIN MEESE III ET AL., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 360 (2005).
Brian H. Bornstein & Timothy R. Robicheaux, Crisis, What Crisis? Perception and Reality
in Civil Justice, in CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL & LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 1–2
(Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008).
57

58
59

Id. at 13.
Vidmar, supra note 24, at 7.

60

For instance, a 1926 article in the Yale Law Journal casually declared, without a source,
“[t]here can be little doubt that the fact that the plaintiff happens to be indigent or that the defendant
is personally unpopular or is a corporation, often has far greater effect upon the jury than the
abstract charge of the trial judge.” William H. Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil
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juries, unlike nearly every other group in modern society, lack any sort of
organized advocacy group, these attacks go unanswered.
The best juries can hope for nowadays is indifference. The Public Papers
of the Presidency of Barack Obama—a compendium of addresses, remarks,
statements, interviews, and other such communications—reveal only a single
glowing reference to the right to trial by jury in his first term.61 For comparison,
he exalted the freedom of speech roughly a dozen times in 2011 alone.62
Oh, how the mighty have fallen.
B. The Jury’s Foundational Role in American Government
Roman tradition holds that Cincinnatus was a small-time farmer
appointed dictator of Rome in 458 B.C. to fend off an invading army.63 He left
his plow behind and defeated the enemy on the field of battle.64 But instead of
consolidating power, he freely surrendered his authority as soon as his task was
completed and returned to his farm.65 Cincinnatus is remembered in history as a
paragon of virtue, humility, and duty.66
This legend was a captivating role model for George Washington, who
left Mount Vernon to lead the Continental Army, but resigned his commission
as Commander in Chief once independence was won and returned to farming.67
Lest the obvious parallels be missed, his fraternal order of wartime officers was
named the Society of Cincinnati.68
The same spirit of simplicity and nobility channeled by Cincinnatus
and Washington lives on today in the jury. Every day, Americans of all stripes
Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 296, 296 (1926). A 1969 article in the Columbia Law Review said, without a
source, “a trial judge is less likely to be influenced by the demeanor of the witnesses than would
be the jury; he is more likely to focus on the probative value of their testimony. He may be less
likely to be the victim of inflamed passions in a sensitive case.” Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal
Cases, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 419, 447 (1969). And a judge asserted, without a source, that “[t]he
judge on average will likely have more disciplined mental skills than the typical juror.” Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Juries and the Complex Case: Observations About the Current Debate, in THE
AMERICAN CIVIL JURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON
ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1987).
61

Barack H. Obama, Remarks to the Parliament in London (May 25, 2011), in PUBLIC PAPERS
598 (2011).

OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: BARACK H. OBAMA
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See PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: BARACK H. OBAMA (2011).
Lucius
Quinctius
Cincinnatus,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lucius-Quinctius-Cincinnatus (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
64
Id.
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Id.
Id.
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and stations are summoned from their normal routine to serve on juries where
they resolve matters of public concern. They hold no elective office, but when
assembled in the jury box they hold near-absolute power over the outcome. Once
the case is over, they yield their awesome power and return to their lives as if
nothing had ever happened.
Given how well juries fit into the American mythos, it is fitting that they
have served as a cornerstone of our system of government. Judge William Young
has observed that, under the federal Constitution, each branch of government has
two types constitutional officers: president and vice president for the executive,
senator and representative for the legislature, and judge and jury for the
judiciary.69 As constitutional officers for the justice system, jurors wield great
power. In all cases, it is an onerous task to get a jury verdict overturned.70 Should
they deliver an acquittal to a criminal defendant, it cannot be overturned.71 And
when there is a unanimous verdict requirement, any one juror may nullify any
law, deny any recovery, or veto any prosecution.
No other government on earth trusts its people to the same extent. In the
1980s, virtually every other country had abandoned juries, meaning four-fifths
of all jury trials occurred in the United States.72 Today, it is nine-tenths.73 Even
in foreign nations where juries have clung on, they are unrepresentative and
subservient.74 European judges are disdainful of how much power American
juries hold.75
But there’s more. Juries operationalize many other rights we hold dear.
The Fourth Amendment was intimately connected to jury rights because it would
be civil juries who determined whether a given search or seizure was
“reasonable.”76 One Antifederalist wrote that if a federal official was searching
“for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman,
and searched under her shift . . . a trial by jury would be our safest resource.”77
A second wrote, “Without [a jury] in civil actions, no relief can be had against
the High Officers of State, for abuse of private citizens.”78
Freedom of speech, protected under the First Amendment, is close to
worthless if the government is the sole arbiter. But thanks to juries, it is not. That
69

YOUNG, supra note 42, at 2.
In the federal system, for example, a jury verdict may only be set aside if “there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for [the prevailing] party.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 50(a)(1).
70

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962).
HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 17, at 30–31.
YOUNG, supra note 42, at 1.
HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 17, at 32.
Id.
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 73 (1998).
Id. at 74.
Id.
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is why, when publishers were prosecuted under the Alien and Sedition Acts, they
pled their case directly to the people through juries.79 And because juries were
empowered to issue a verdict in libel or slander cases, they were the ones
determining the boundaries of free speech.80 Indeed, by acquitting publishers
charged with treason, colonial juries helped establish the inestimable principle
that the press should be free to criticize the government.81 The Thirteenth
Amendment bars involuntary servitude unless a person is duly convicted of a
crime.82 Because all criminal defendants have a right to jury trials, no person
may be subjected to involuntary labor without a chance to put it to a vote of 12
peers.83 And by forbidding bills of attainder, the Constitution made sure that
juries, not legislatures, would be the arbiters of guilt.84
Were that not enough, juries were once the primary government
regulators in the country. They enforced taxes, oversaw public works projects,
and set welfare rolls,85 and in frontier states, they were “effective sounding
boards in making known the desires of the people and served as a curb upon the
activities of public officials.”86 Grand juries had broad powers to investigate
suspected wrongdoing by government corruption and bring it to light. Illinois
tasked them with investigating prisons and jails to report on conditions.87 It was
like a blue-ribbon commission on corruption in every courthouse.88 Petit juries,
or trial juries, had the power to judge both law and fact.89 One jury foreman was
so bold as to ask a judge whether the legal instructions given were “raly the law,
or whether it was only jist your notion.”90
As the following pages show, juries often used their powers to not only
inject community values into the courtroom, invigorate civic participation
among the population, and ensure robust deliberation on weighty matters, but
also help make society a little more equal.

79
80
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83
84

Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–24.
Landsman, supra note 43, at 593.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

85

Stephan Landsman, Juries as Regulators of Last Resort, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1061,
1062 (2014).
86
87

STACY PRATT MCDERMOTT, THE JURY IN LINCOLN’S AMERICA 52 (2012).
Id. at 32.

88

NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 85 (1937).
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III. JURIES IN EARLY AMERICA
Leveling the playing field was a key feature of the American jury from
its outset. Pro-jury rhetoric was suffused with anti-elitist sentiments. The jury
was a “repository of the people’s sense of justice, reason, and fair play,” whereas
judges were seen as elite government officials on the government payroll.91 The
government, in turn, was seen as partial toward the wealthy and the executive
branch.92
Many founders also saw juries as inherently resistant to corruption. On
this point, even bitter rivals like Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton
could agree. Jefferson explained that permanent classes of judges would develop
a sense of camaraderie that would leave them vulnerable to bribery and partisan
loyalties, but “the opinion of 12 honest jurymen gives still a better hope of right”
than judges.93 Hamilton concurred, saying it is much harder to corrupt a
temporary, ephemeral body like a jury than a fixed judge.94
Juries were also seen as necessary to check the class bias of judges.95
This was hardly a new idea. A few decades before, Sir William Blackstone wrote
that the presence of juries “prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and
wealthy citizens” and the absence of them would be “a step towards establishing
aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute governments.”96 One key reason for
this was that judges, being drawn from a princely social stratum, would
“frequently [have] an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank and
dignity.”97
A. Prerevolutionary America: Juries v. the Crown
England had given the colonists good reason to cherish juries. For as this
Section demonstrates, juries had stood up to the Crown many times. In so doing,
they helped ensure that even those in power were not above the law.
Today, the reasonableness of search warrants is determined beforehand
by a judge.98 But this was not always so. Once, virtually any search and seizure
would instead be litigated after the fact.99 Defendants who were wronged by the
91

Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 41 (1994).

92

Alan H. Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment,
and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 150 (1991).
93

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abbé Arnoux (July 19, 1789), in THE PAPERS
THOMAS JEFFERSON 282–83 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
94
95
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97
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Haddon, supra note 91.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 380.
Id. at 379.
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government could go before a jury to determine if the search was lawful, and if
it was not, seek damages.100 After a jury trial, the defendant could not only get
the search declared unlawful, but the government official could be made liable
for compensatory—and perhaps punitive—damages.101
English juries routinely soaked government officials for unlawful
searches. In Wilkes v. Wood102 and Entick v. Carrington,103 the government
defendants—with warrants—broke into and ransacked the homes of plaintiffs in
search of seditious libel. The jury found against the defendants and awarded the
plaintiffs damages. In the Wilkes case, damages were even awarded against Lord
Halifax, the head of government.104 In Huckle v. Money,105 another wrongful
search and seizure case, the actual damages to the plaintiff were relatively small,
only 20 pounds, but the jury was so aghast they also imposed exemplary damages
of ten times that amount against 15 different government officers. No wonder
government officials prefer adjudicating warrants before the fact.106
Things went even worse for the Crown when it tried to crack down on
colonists. Take libel. In England, it was commonly used as a tool to suppress
anti-government speech. John Wilkes, for instance, was a British politician who
openly decried government abuses.107 In response, the government convicted
him, in absentia, of libel after Lord Chief Justice Mansfield told the jury they
were to find him guilty.108 Bookseller John Almon published a pamphlet
criticizing Lord Mansfield’s arbitrary and capricious handling of the Wilkes
case.109 Almon found himself prosecuted for libel against Lord Mansfield, and
the court held that criticisms of judges could be summarily punished without a
jury.110 Wilkes and Almon were hardly alone. Hundreds were convicted of libel
in England in the 17th and 18th centuries.111
But in the American colonies, opposition by local juries flipped the
script. Publisher John Peter Zenger criticized the colonial governor in 1734, and
the jury acquitted him when the government brought charges in spite of the
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id. at 70.
Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s St. Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
Landsman, supra note 43, at 591.
Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
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AMAR, supra note 76, at 69.
Nancy LoPatin-Lummis, Man of Contradictions, 58 J. LIBERAL HIST. 43, 43–44 (2008)
(reviewing ARTHUR H. CASH, JOHN WILKES, THE SCANDALOUS FATHER OF CIVIL LIBERTY (2006)).
108
Id. at 44.
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109

Thomas M. Keck et al., The Judicial Protection of Anti-Judicial Speech, 33 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 693, 698 (2018).
110
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strong evidence of guilt.112 Another time, preacher William Penn was prosecuted
for delivering a fiery sermon in defiance of the Church of England.113 The jury
included a mariner, a brewer, a vintner, an artisan, a baker, a merchant, a
blacksmith, a carpenter, a currier, a tradesman, and a clerk.114 The judge,
expecting a pliant jury, instructed them to convict.115 When the jury refused, the
judge said,
Gentleman, you shall not be dismissed till you bring in a verdict
which the court will accept. You shall be locked up without
meat, drink, fire, or tobacco. You shall not think thus to abuse
the court. We will have a verdict by the help of God or you shall
starve for it.116
The judge made good on his word, but the jury was implacable.117
Treatises praising juries quickly flooded the market and left a strong impression
on Americans.118
Juries also refused to convict libelers. Throughout the colonies, only a
half-dozen libel prosecutions were attempted, and only two of those secured
convictions.119 So steadfast was the opposition to libel laws that colonial juries
“all but nullified the law of seditious libel” in pre-revolutionary America.120
Juries also refused to indict Stamp Act protestors and other patriots.121 In New
York, grand juries refused to indict rioters to register their displeasure with
British rule.122 Virginia grand juries took a different approach, indicting
aristocrats for petty offenses.123
And juries refused to convict smugglers. As a typical example, John
Hancock—of penmanship fame—made much of his fortune through illegal

112

Kevin E. Sralla, The Search for Harmful Prejudice: An Analysis of People v. Budzyn and the
Underlying Purpose of the Jury System, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 259, 263–64 (2000).
113
McClung, supra note 26, at 37.
114
115
116
117
118
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Nancy Jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 41 (1999).
McClung, supra note 26, at 37.
Id.
Id.
Landsman, supra note 43, at 591.
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 45, at 874.
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AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 424 (2012).
122
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smuggling.124 When stopped by customs officials, Hancock refused to allow
them to inspect his cargo.125 As was common at the time, officials did not even
bother to seek an indictment against someone accused of smuggling, for they
knew the grand jury would never go for it.126 Later, they went ahead and seized
the goods through the juryless admiralty court.127 But Hancock sued for trespass,
and the jury was all too happy to not only return his goods but fine the
government official too.128 Such was the state of affairs that one colonial
governor complained, “‘A Custom house officer has no chance with a jury,’ and
another protested, ‘A trial by jury here is only trying one illicit trader by his
fellows, or at least by his well-wishers.’”129
Thanks to juries, oppressive laws were dead letters. So, when Parliament
wanted to actually enforce something, they made sure to subtract juries from the
equation. The Dockyards Act achieved this by removing some prosecutions to
England—robbing defendants of a chance to have a local jury.130 After the
Boston Tea Party and the accompanying destruction of property, England passed
the Boston Port Act, which was effectively a judgment of liability against the
people of Boston stating that they had not made “full satisfaction” for the cost of
the destroyed tea.131 Americans saw the destroyed tea as a tort matter that should
have been resolved by a jury.132
And when Parliament wanted to increase customs revenues, it did not
need to raise rates or hire more enforcers; it simply had to eliminate juries. That’s
why the Sugar Act of 1764 had customs collection cases tried in admiralty
court—where judges appointed by the King, instead of juries drawn from the
citizenry, would reign supreme.133 Even though the law cut the tax rate in half,
the removal of juries meant it was intended to increase revenues.134
Violations of jury rights fanned the flames of revolution. Patriots argued
that anti-jury laws deprived them of a right that they as Englishmen were entitled
to through colonial charters.135 The First Continental Congress called for jury
124

See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY
24 (2000).
125
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trials in its Declaration and Resolves, which set out American rights.136 When
Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence, he admonished the King for
“depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury” and for “transporting
us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences,” which subverted local juries.
B. Adopting and Ratifying the Constitution with Juries as a Major
Sticking Point
After the Constitution was hammered out in Philadelphia, it went to the
states for ratification.137 Jury rights were a frequent topic, and the lack of civil
jury rights was one of the harshest criticisms of the document.138 Joseph
M’Dowall declared bluntly, “Trial by jury is not secured. The objections against
this want of security have not been cleared up in a satisfactory manner. It is
neither secured in civil nor criminal cases.”139
Beyond jeremiads about the lack of juries, many delegates were openly
fearful of unchecked judges abusing the poor and lowly.140 Thomas Tredwell of
New York bemoaned how foreign courts that took life and property without jury
trials were the cause of “much misery and a more rapid depopulation” of those
nations.141 Critics repeatedly warned that wealthy citizens would control the
administration without juries—the only government institution free from the
control of “oligarchs.”142 William Grayson of Virginia was so pessimistic he
wondered if even juries would be enough to secure the poor a fair shot.143
After the conventions were over, Antifederalists started beating the same
drum around the country. One said the federal courts served no purpose but to
“accumulate costs against the poor debtors who are already unable to pay their
just debts . . . . [T]he poorer and middling class of citizens will be under the
necessity of submitting to the demands of the rich and the lordly.”144
Antifederalists argued that juries had been taken away in the federal

136
137

WALDREP, supra note 122, at 21.
U.S. Const. art. VII.

138

Of the six state ratifying conventions that proposed amendments, five proposed adding civil
jury rights. MEESE ET AL., supra note 56, at 359.
139
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Vol.
IV,
211
(1836),
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html [hereinafter Debates of North Carolina]; see
also JACK N. RAKOVE, THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
198 n.71 (2009); MAIER, supra note 38, at 44.
140
E.g., Debates of North Carolina, supra note 139, at Vol. III 431, 569.
141
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Id. at Vol. II, 397.
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government,145 and that cases submitted to a judge would be “almost a certain
prospect of ruin, at least in those cases where the middle and common class of
citizens are interested.”146 Another complained, “[B]ut what satisfaction can we
expect from a lordly [judge] always ready to protect the officers of government
against the weak and helpless citizens”?147
Of particular concern were debtors. During the Revolution, contracts
required payments at high prices because paper money was so heavily
devalued.148 After the war, paying off contract prices could destroy debtors.149
Patrick Henry worried that without civil juries guaranteed by the Constitution,
American debtors could be dragged into federal court and fleeced by judges,
meaning that “the liberty and happiness of our citizens [will be] gone, never
again to be recovered.”150 M’Dowell fretted that the federal courts would allow
“the wealthy to recover unjustly of the poor man.”151
Pro-debtors were worried not only about the lack of juries, but the lack
of local juries. When tried in a familiar setting, a debtor “could hope that his
creditor would be forced to bring suit in the debtor’s local court where, under the
protection of favorable local laws, the debtor might receive a sympathetic
hearing before a jury composed of his friends and relatives.”152 The original
Constitution required only that criminal trials take place in the state where they
were located, and said nothing about requirements for civil juries.153 The Sixth
Amendment narrowed criminal trials to the state and district, but the Seventh
Amendment was silent about where juries were drawn.154 James Madison
proposed explicitly stating that jurors should be drawn from the vicinage of the
crime, meaning the local neighborhood, but the Senate voted him down.155
This matter was hugely consequential for litigants, and poor ones doubly
so. In an age when travel was nasty, poor, brutish, and long, it could be expensive
to get to court. And criminal defendants could be charged for the cost to summon
distant jurors, and the cost of incarceration while they awaited the start of trial.156
M’Dowell argued that the rich would have an unfair advantage without local
Id. (“[T]he trial by jury, which has so justly been the boast of our forefathers as well as
ourselves[,] is taken away under them.”).
146
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juries because the poor would be forced to hoof great distances to go to court.157
Moreover, the farther away a trial was held, the more likely evidence would be
submitted through written depositions rather than live testimony.158 Because only
the richer members of society could read, distant trials might shut the poor out
of legal proceedings altogether.159
The Sixth Amendment’s requirement that jurors come from the same
district as the crime would have been a small comfort. Even judicial districts
could be hundreds of miles long—as they still are today160—assuming states
were subdivided into districts at all. Colonial Virginia held all of its trials in
Jamestown no matter where the crime occurred.161 New York once held trial
court only in New York City and Albany.162 So what was to stop states from
creating geographically vast districts? All in all, the concern for local debtors
was one of the chief motivations for opposing the Constitution.163
These fears were prophetic. Before the Revolution, local juries were
sympathetic toward debtors and refused to enforce rigid rules.164 But the
delegates in Philadelphia had been decidedly pro-creditor,165 and prominent
Federalists were fearful about the poor serving on juries en masse.166 The
Constitution empowered creditors to sue debtors and drag them into federal
court, meaning an English merchant could sue an American debtor and deprive
them of a local jury of their peers.167 Sure enough, in the 1790s, hundreds of
Americans lost federal suits to British creditors—even Thomas Jefferson.168
Bowing in part to the critics, the Bill of Rights was quickly proposed after the
government formed, and the Seventh Amendment—guaranteeing the right to
civil juries—was adopted without debate.169 Madison went so far as to propose

157
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prohibiting states from infringing on jury rights, calling it of “equal if not greater
importance than” the other amendments, but was rejected by the Senate.170
Madison was on to something, for America’s honeymoon with juries
was short lived. It soon forgot the lessons of its founding and states started
depriving disfavored groups of jury rights, as the next two sections make plain.
Perhaps it was because jury nullification was considerably less appealing to
government officials when it was American, not British, laws being invalidated.
Early juries, for instance, refused to convict defendants of crimes because even
relatively minor offenses carried the death penalty.171
C. The Whiskey Tax and the Subversion of Local Juries
The Whiskey Tax is another prime example. As a means of shoring up
American credit, the federal government assumed state debts owed during the
Revolutionary War. But to pay for these debts, the government would need
revenue.172 But who would pay for it? Not Wall Street and the stockjobbers of
the east. And not Southern slaveholders with their lush plantations. No, to fund
it, the government would look west.
Many farmers, often recent immigrants seeking economic opportunity
and personal liberty on the frontier, settled along the banks of the Mississippi
and Ohio rivers and their environs.173 They found themselves living in
“lice-infested hovels and scratching out a bare subsistence on land owned by
absentee landlords.”174
Despite their poverty, Congress decided that they should bear the costs
of financing the national debt and passed a whiskey tax and authorized
excisemen to enforce it.175 Taking a feather out of the British playbook, the law
called for prosecutions under the law to be tried in federal courts in
Philadelphia—many miles and a world away—depriving the farmers of a local
jury and necessitating a financially ruinous journey east.176 A few years earlier
at the state ratifying convention, a young John Marshall mocked the idea that a
Virginian defendant on the eastern shore could be forced to travel west to
Kentucky for trial, because such an idea would be far too unpopular to become
law.177 But less than a decade later, the country proved him wrong.

170
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These laws were despised by western farmers, for whiskey was essential
to their commerce and culture. It served as a form of currency, medicine, and
social lubricant to them.178 And unlike eastern farmers near large markets,
westerners had to distill their grains into whiskey so that it could be more
efficiently transported over rugged terrain, thus bringing their harvests under the
ambit of the tax.179
Buckling to intense resistance to the tax, Congress tried to appease the
farmers by allowing for local trial for prosecutions under the law.180 But when
federal officials tried suing out west, local juries refused to convict defendants
accused of violating them, rendering the laws inoperative.181
D. States Erode Jury Rights in a Variety of Ways
If Congress tried to diminish jury rights in its early days, state
legislatures were serial offenders too. For example, at the dawn of the 19th
century, Pennsylvania’s legislature tried to create an arbitration system that
would have replaced judges and juries alike, only to have it vetoed by the
governor.182 Most of these kinds of laws, however, were not vetoed.183
Early courts stood up for jury rights in some areas though. In 1785, North
Carolina passed a law confiscating property from British subjects and denying
them a jury trial.184 All that was needed to accomplish the confiscation was an
affidavit.185 The high court found the law unconstitutional.186 Incidentally, this
was also purportedly the first time a court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional,187 and it occurred twenty years before Marbury v. Madison.188
Juries were also at the heart of the very first due process case. In 1795,
Robert Randall tried to bribe several congressmen “to grant him land in the
Northwest Territory.”189 Much to his surprise, rather than accepting the boodle,
the Speaker of the House had him arrested, the House voted him guilty of

178

Kyff, supra note 172.
Michael Hoover, The Whiskey Rebellion, ALCOHOL &TOBACCO TAX & TRADE BUREAU
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182
183
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185
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42 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 487 (James P. McClure et al. eds., 2016).
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See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 130, at 1711.
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contempt, and had him detained.190 Randall then became the first American to
assert a due process violation: that the House had improperly punished him
without a grand jury indictment or conviction by an impartial jury.191 This time,
however, the arguments were unsuccessful, and Congress to this day has the
power to punish non-members for contempt.192
Beyond landmark cases, there were many routine examples of states
abrogating jury rights, usually to help enforce a government policy more
efficiently, and courts rebuffing them. Rhode Island passed a law in 1786 that
penalized anyone who refused to accept paper money, and guilt was determined
without a jury.193 A butcher in Newport only accepted silver or gold coins as
payment, and the state sought to fine him.194 Although the butcher’s objections
are not stated, paper money was widely distrusted then thanks to severe inflation
and irresponsible monetary policy by colonial legislatures.195 He probably did
not want it because accepting paper money could have spelled disaster for his
business.196 The state high court in Trevett v. Weeden invalidated the law.197 It
did not explain its decision, but since the defense was premised on the paramount
importance of jury trials, that was probably the basis for the ruling.198 At the
time, judges were legislatively appointed for one-year terms, and the legislature
responded to this decision by throwing out all the judges.199
In 1820, South Carolina passed a law imposing a $10,000 fine (nearly
$200,000 in today’s dollars) on anyone selling lottery tickets and authorizing tax
officials to collect without a jury conviction.200 The Constitutional Court of
Appeals of South Carolina held that “the liability of the party must first be
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Id.
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Id. at 1743 (citing McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) and Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) as reaffirmations of this principle).
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(2013),
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established by a jury of his country, and not by the arbitrary fiat of any
individual,” and thus struck down the law.201
In 1829, Tennessee established a special court to adjudicate cases where
the state bank accused a defendant of defaulting on his or her debts to the bank.202
The court sat in equity, which meant it had the power to determine facts without
a jury, and its decisions were not subject to appeal.203 Three debtor-defendants
sued, arguing the law violated the right to trial by jury.204 Although the Tennessee
Supreme Court agreed that juries were not required in equity cases, it rejected
the notion that the legislature had the power to expand equity jurisdiction to
include this sort of case.205 To do so would give it the power to infinitely diminish
the right to a jury trial, rendering it “a very useless one indeed.”206 Each of the
three judges of the Supreme Court wrote different opinions, but they all agreed
that the law was an unconstitutional abridgment of jury rights.207
An 1825 New Jersey law tried to remove juries from small cases, but the
high court smacked it down.208 Even a seizure law that reduced the jury from 12
to six for its cases was held unconstitutional by the state supreme court.209 An
1851 Maine law that doubled the punishment if a defendant elected to try the
case before a jury was invalidated.210 And a second Maine law that required
defendants to post bond in order to get a jury befell the same fate,211 as did a
similar Rhode Island law.212 On occasion, even local governments got in on the
action; the city of Charleston passed a bylaw regulating soap and candle
production and authorizing fines without a jury, and the Court of Common Pleas
rebuked them.213
Although there are many examples of courts safeguarding jury rights
against encroachments by other branches of government, the courts’ track record
is far from perfect. On February 1, 1800—the tenth anniversary of its first
session—the United States Supreme Court refused to strike down a bill of
201

Id. at 62.

202

State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 608 (1831) (Peck, J.).
Id. at 599–600 (Green, J.).
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See generally Hinchly v. Mach., 15 N.J.L. 476 (1836). Sixty years later, New Jersey passed
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it down. State v. Lane, 28 A. 421, 421 (N.J. 1893).
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State v. Gurney, 37 Me. 156, 163–64 (1853).
See Inhabitants of Saco v. Wentworth, 37 Me. 165, 176 (1853).
See Greene v. Briggs, 10 F.Cas. 1135, 1144 (Cir. Ct. D.R.I. 1852).
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attainder passed by the Georgia legislature to seize property from people it
declared treasonous.214
Many early courts also used their contempt powers to punish critics
directly, bypassing juries. Because contempt can be imposed on the judge’s own
accord, they can serve as “party, prosecutor, judge, and jury.”215 In 1788, after
Eleazer Oswald questioned the impartiality of the judges in his libel case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court fined and imprisoned him for contempt—without
a jury.216 Four years later, the same court meted out a similar juryless punishment
to Thomas Passmore for contempt.217 One survey of pre-1940 cases found that
of 29 state high court cases involving speech acts criticizing a judge (and one
criticizing a grand jury), 23 rejected free speech arguments and held the speaker
in a contempt.218
IV. FUGITIVE SLAVE LAWS
Juries are not normally looked to as bastions of racial justice. And
understandably so. A great many were infected by racial animus that prevented
black litigants from having a fair chance. Emmett Till, the Scottsboro Boys, and
Lemuel Penn are all examples of cases where juries decided the case not on the
evidence, but on prejudice. Hundreds more cases met the same fate.219 As noted
in the introduction, however, this does not mean all jury verdicts are prejudiced.
Northern juries eviscerated the Fugitive Slave Act, a prime example of an unjust
law, as the following section shows.
A. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
To understand the law, one must look back to the original Constitution.
The Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution permitted the recapture of escaped
slaves. It euphemistically reads:
No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law
or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour,
but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such
service or labour may be due.220
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Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800).
Thomas M. Keck et al., The Judicial Protection of Anti-Judicial Speech, 33 AM. U. INT’L L.
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216
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However easy it might be to accuse a black person in the North of being
a runaway, slaveholders would need to prove the identity of the person they
accused. Some states left this determination to juries.221
Abolitionists were confident that juries would stridently refuse to
enforce this law if given the chance.222 Senator Charles Sumner wondered, “How
can justice be administered throughout States thronging with colored fellowcitizens unless you have them on the juries?”223 One American Anti-Slavery
Society member averred, “Give the panting fugitive this inestimable right [to a
jury trial] in every northern State, and he is safe.”224
Evidently concerned that juries could not be trusted to consistently rule
in favor of slaveholders, Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Act in 1793, which
allowed slave catchers to bypass juries.225 The Act authorized slaveholders to
“seize or arrest” an alleged fugitive, drag them before a judge, and cart them off
to bondage if they provided “proof to the satisfaction of such judge or magistrate,
either by oral testimony or affidavit,” that the claim person was a slave.226 There
was no opportunity to contest the allegations.
The Act led to clashes between the states as abolitionists worked to resist
the federal law, often centered on juries. In 1826, Pennsylvania passed a law that
made it illegal to kidnap any black person with the intent to sell them into
slavery.227 In 1832, Margaret Morgan escaped from bondage in Maryland and
fled to Pennsylvania.228 A few years later, Edward Prigg was sent to apprehend
Morgan, but Prigg was arrested and prosecuted for violating the anti-slavery
law.229 The jury convicted him.230 However, on appeal the Supreme Court
interpreted the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause to provide “a positive,
unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or
regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control or restrain.”231 The state law,
and the jury's verdict, were thus invalidated.232
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(2015).
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Forman, supra note 18, at 901.
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Margaret Morgan was not alone. In the early 1830s, slaveholder Mary
Martin claimed to own a man simply named Jack, calling him a fugitive slave.233
Jack moved for a writ of personal replevin or a writ that allowed a prisoner to
get before a jury. In July 1834, the trial court ruled against Jack, saying that states
could not interfere with slavery. The appeals court affirmed.234
In 1836, Matilda Lawrence escaped from slavery in Missouri to Ohio,
where she was arrested, and Larkin Lawrence claimed her as his property.235
Typically, alleged runaway slaves appeared before a magistrate for a
determination of their fate without the benefit of a jury.236 She argued that she
was entitled to a jury trial before she could be condemned to involuntary
servitude.237 But the plea fell on deaf ears, as the judge ruled that Matilda
Lawrence would be returned to slavery.238
During this time many newspapers viewed these sorts of cases through
the lens of jury rights. Abolitionist papers criticized how the Fugitive Slave Act
denied jury trials, and when northern states passed local laws to defeat the federal
law, these papers cheered.239 “The National Era and the Circular applauded the
efforts of Vermont, New York, and New Jersey to guarantee the ‘right of a trial
by jury to all people, including fugitive slaves.’”240 An article in the Chicago
Daily Tribune said any law that deprived people of juries was “dangerous and
unjust.”241 By the 1830s, abolitionists focused so much on jury rights that it
became “the central feature in their argument.”242
B. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
Because of the fierce opposition to the law in the North, Southerners
began agitating for a new, stronger version of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1848 and
again in 1850.243 A New Jersey Senator proposed giving juries the power to
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WALDREP, supra note 122, at 41.

234

Id.
See Salmon P. Chase, Speech of Salmon P. Chase in the Case of The Colored Woman,
Matilda 4 (Mar. 11, 1837).
236
Matilda
Lawrence,
QUEENS
QUEEN
CITY
(Sept.
8,
2017),
https://queensofqueencity.com/2017/09/08/matilda-lawrence/.
237
See id.
235

238
239
240
241
242
243

Id.
See MCDERMOTT, supra note 86, at 12.
Id.
Id.
WALDREP, supra note 122, at 41.
See Forman, supra note 18, at 902.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol122/iss2/7

26

Monea: Bulwark of Equality: The Jury in America

2019]

BULWARK OF EQUALITY

539

consider the claims made by slaveholders.244 New York Senator William Seward
had a proposal to guarantee all accused fugitive slaves the right to a jury.245
These kinds of ideas drew Southern ire. A Virginia senator remarked,
“If you pass a law which shall require a trial by jury, not one man in twenty
whose slave escapes will incur the risks or expense of going after the fugitive.”246
Congress voted down the jury trial proposal but passed the law, which made it
even easier for a slaveholder to recover an alleged fugitive. All the slaveholder
had to do was produce an affidavit to a federal commissioner signed by a
southern court officer saying the claimant owned the alleged fugitive.247 At the
private hearing, the accused could not testify on their own behalf, had no right
to an attorney, had no right to an appeal, and the commissioner would be paid
more if the accused was deemed a slave.248 Thus, it was easier to claim ownership
of a person than ownership of cattle.249
Cases litigating this new law soon followed. Arguments about jury rights
helped avoid a conviction in Butler v. Craig.250 The plaintiff was a woman named
Mary Butler who claimed to be the descendant of a free white woman and sought
a declaration of her freedom.251 The defendant claimed her mother married a
slave he owned, and thus he should be her master and she his slave.252 The record
is thin on the court’s exact reasoning, though Butler argued that if her mother
married a slave, that would be a crime.253 But since no jury had convicted the
mother of any crime, the court could not infer that her mother married a slave,
and thus, Butler herself had no connection to the defendant.254 It appears the court
bought into this line of reasoning, as it said there were no surviving records of
Butler’s parents’ legal status, and the court would make no presumptions.255
The 1850 version of the Fugitive Slave Act also made it a crime for
anyone to help a fugitive slave.256 Although judges told juries to enforce this
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provision of the law, scores of northern juries disobeyed and refused to convict
on these grounds.257
One such example is United States v. Morris.258 Three defendants were
prosecuted for aiding and abetting runaway slaves.259 During trial, the defense
counsel told the jury that if the jury believed the Fugitive Slave Act was
unconstitutional, they should acquit regardless of any contrary direction by the
judge.260 Justice Curtis, sitting as a trial court judge, interrupted and said that the
lawyer could not make that argument.261 In the opinion, he emphasized that the
defense’s position was untenable.262 The acquittal was overturned on these
grounds.263
Another example is In re Booth.264 Joshua Glover escaped from slavery
in Missouri in 1854—aided by Sherman Booth—and fled to Wisconsin. But a
federal marshal arrested Booth under warrant authorization from a
commissioner.265 Booth argued that before he could be imprisoned, they would
have to prove their claim to a jury, not a commissioner, citing both a violation of
his right to a jury and improper delegation of judicial power to the
commissioners.266 For those reasons, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
1850 law was repugnant to the Constitution and Glover must have his rights
determined by a jury of his peers.267 A jury was later empaneled and acquitted
him on most of the charges.268
However, the United Supreme Court would have the last word. The
aggrieved federal marshal appealed, and Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney,
writing for the majority, reversed the state case on federal supremacy grounds.
In Ableman v. Booth, the Court said it was a matter for the federal courts to cure
any supposed defects with the 1850 law, not a state court.269 To clear up any
confusion, the Court clarified that the law was fully constitutional, the
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commissioner could issue the warrant, and the process was “regular and
conformable to law.”270
Even after the Court had ordained the Fugitive Slave Law, Southerners
nursed a grudge, and their outrage over how the Fugitive Slave Act had been
thwarted helped push them to secede. Tennessee Governor Isham Harris,
speaking before the Tennessee Secession convention, groused about how the
northern people impaired the value of slavery by “constant agitation and refusal
to deliver up the fugitive.”271 One delegate to Virginia’s secession convention
mocked the idea of blacks serving on juries and bemoaned the impossibility of
recapturing runaways in the North.272 When justifying its decision to secede,
Mississippi passed a declaration complaining that the North “has nullified the
Fugitive Slave Law in almost every free State in the Union.”273
V. RAILROADS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
The Industrial Revolution transformed society and made organized
business an ever-larger part of life.274 Perhaps no other industry represents the
sea change as well as railroads. For as long as humankind has traded, it needed
a way to transport goods. By sea, people could use relatively swift and
inexpensive ships. By land, their choices were poor. Beasts of burden were
stubborn and sluggish. So, when the first railroad charters were granted in
1815,275 trains must have seemed miraculous. Despite all the early imperfections
of railroads, they could transport goods far faster than animals.276
Understandably, the young nation developed an insatiable appetite for
railroads. By 1840, 3,000 miles of track had been laid.277 By 1860, it was 30,000
miles.278 By 1880, it was 93,000 miles.279 And by 1916, it was 254,000—more
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miles of track than any other nation on earth, a distinction it maintains to this
day.280 By the eve of the Civil War, trains had “altered cities, generated new
industries, and created thousands of jobs.”281 Additionally, the rise of the modern
stock market is largely due to railroad companies’ need for capital.282 One writer
observed, “America was made by the railroads. They united the country and then
stimulated the economic development that enabled the country to become the
world’s richest nation.”283
Railroads brought enormous economic benefits, but they had costs too.
Irish, German, and Chinese immigrants—and in the South, slaves—toiled to lay
tracks.284 The transcontinental railroad was death to the bison and other game
that Native Americans depended on and brought settlers to Native lands.285 Rail
line monopolies charged farmers exorbitant freight costs to ship their goods to
market, robbing them not only of their wealth but their sense of self-reliance
from when farming was local.286
Drawbacks of the railroad notwithstanding, legislatures and courts did
everything they could to speed up and protect this economic dynamo. There were
ploys: states lavished railroad companies with tax breaks, permitted them to hold
lotteries to raise funds, granted monopolies, and even authorized them to
establish special banks.287
There was also a concerted effort to disempower juries. A common
complaint was that juries were a luxury that could no longer be afforded. In Ohio,
Michigan, and Indiana, constitutional conventions debated eliminating grand
juries because they would be too expensive, even though grand juries only cost
about a penny per person per year.288 Similar cries of economic necessity was
used to justify eliminating juries in England when the landed aristocracy joined
forces with commercial interests to erode the jury system in the mid-nineteenth
century.289
But there was another, graver fear: Juries might strangle commerce. A
coalition of merchants, bankers, and industrialists joined together to demand a
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more sympathetic and predictable justice system, which meant stripping juries
of their power to set the law.290 Courts joined in on the call to limit jury power.291
Some judges bought into the notion that juries could not be trusted. In
ruling that a plaintiff’s case could be dismissed without a jury, an 1852 court said
“in certain controversies between the weak and the strong—between a humble
individual and a gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind
naturally, honestly and generously, run to the assistance and support of the
feeble, and apparently oppressed.”292 Such moral calculus, the court concluded,
“is wholly inconsistent with the principles of law and the ends of justice.”293
Judges often saw juries as biased against railroad companies and other
corporations, believing they would kill the golden goose.294 Two strategies to
curtail juries in the context of railroads bear note: (1) loosening the rules of
eminent domain, and (2) shielding railroad companies from legal liabilities for
the injuries and deaths they caused.
A. Juries Are Removed from the Eminent Domain Process
In England, juries had been used since at least 1696 to assess
compensation owed to property owners who had their land taken for public
works projects.295 Even back then, there was some opposition to juries, for when
Parliament passed future public works statutes it empowered justices of the
peace, arbitration, or a surveyor to determine compensation, although some acts
still gave juries a role in the process.296
America, too, relied on juries early on for eminent domain proceedings.
The Fifth Amendment ensures that the government may only take private
property if it provides “just compensation.” Who determines whether
compensation is just? Typically juries.297 For example, a New York law
authorized commissioners to seize land to build private projects, but had a jury
determine the compensation owed to the landowners who had their property
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eminent domain statutes “typically provided for juries to award compensation for the land taken”).
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taken.298 The federal government also provided for juries to determine the value
of a taking.299 Many states went so far as to guarantee the right to juries in private
taking cases through their constitutions.300
Sometimes, courts stood up for these rights. In Armstrong v. Jackson ex
dem. Elliott,301 the plaintiff obtained a judgment evicting the defendant, and a
statute provided for three commissioners to assess the value of the property.302
The state supreme court recognized that the law conflicted with the constitution’s
guarantee to jury trials, and that if it was permitted to be used for damage
assessments, commissioners could replace juries in any type of case.303 It
therefore affirmed the trial court’s decision to set aside the report of the
commissioners.304
This restraint went out the window during the frenzy of the railway
boom. By the 1800s, governments commonly used eminent domain to take
private property and give it to private entrepreneurs to build private turnpikes,
bridges, and canals.305 Legislatures passed laws granting railroad companies
nearly carte blanche eminent domain powers, and courts upheld them.306 Armed
with eminent domain power, building tracks became as simple as selecting a
route, confiscating the land, assessing the damages, and paying the owner.307
Although farmers resented having their land seized by the railroad companies,
they were powerless to stop it.308
Juries would ordinarily be involved in the damage assessment phase, but
not always. Illinois used court-appointed commissioners in eminent domain
cases.309 Commissioners would assess the value of the land and set the dollar
value, and hundreds of such commissions were used by the state in the 1850s.310
The court could appoint seven commissioners, and only five were needed to

298

Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140, 141–42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). This law was struck down
because it authorized property to be taken for private purposes, but it still highlights how baked
into the process juries were. See id. at 148.
299

Blair, supra note 295, at 37.
See Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by
Government: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232, 249–50 (1973).
301
1 Blackf. 374, 374 (1825).
300

302
303

Id. at 374.
See id. at 375–76.

304

Id. at 376.
DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & MARY MASSARON ROSS, EMINENT DOMAIN USE AND ABUSE: KELO
IN CONTEXT 129 (2006).
306
See, e.g., Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837).
305

307
308
309
310

WOLMAR, supra note 279, at 28.
See id. at 27.
MCDERMOTT, supra note 86, at 39.
Id. at 39, 191–92.
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render a decision.311 In Illinois, the commissioner law was challenged as
violating the state constitution.312 Addressing the argument that the law
substituted jurors for commissioners, the court held that jury rights only extended
“to suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars.”313 It traced the history of the constitutional provision to conclude that it
was never intended to apply to damage assessment proceedings since the law
was in effect when the constitution was adopted.314 And it said there was a
difference between a court case and an out-of-court damage assessment.315 In
sum, “it was competent for the legislature to provide that [damage assessments]
should be ascertained without the intervention of a jury.”316
Mississippi adopted the same reasoning. In 1883, the New Orleans
Railroad Company sought to construct a road through the property of Mr. E.S.
Drake, who disagreed with the company about the value of the land.317 The
legislature had authorized the company to take private land for the construction
of its roads, and provided that the Chancery Court could appoint commissioners
who would assess the value of the property, and only after that point could a
party demand a jury.318 The commissioner system was challenged, and the Court
quickly dismissed the claim that commissioners could not replace a jury.319 The
Court got around the jury requirement by reasoning that property assessments
were not “matter[s],” “case[s],” or “cause[s],” as those terms were used in the
Constitution—they were a class all their own.320 So the legislature was free to
fashion new rules for them.
Many other courts had similar systems. In 1808, Kentucky was perhaps
the first state to use commissioners to assess damages in lieu of juries, and it used
it often.321 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court blessed a law that permitted six
commissioners to assess damages for property destroyed by mobs.322 Iowa and
Wisconsin also followed the Illinois model.323 Not only did these commissions
311

See Ross v. Irving, 14 Ill. 171, 172 (1852).

312

Id. at 174.
Id. at 179.

313
314

See id. at 180–81.
Id. at 181 (citing Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45, 73 (N.Y.
Ch. 1831)).
316
Id. at 182 (quoting Campbell v. Head, 13 Ill. 122, 127 (1851)).
315

317
318
319
320

See New Orleans, B. R., V. & M. R. Co. v. Drake, 60 Miss. 621, 621 (1882).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 626.

321

See, e.g., Fisher v. Cockerill, 21 Ky. (5 T.B. Mon.) 129 (1827); Fowler v. Halbert, 7 Ky. (4
Bibb) 52 (1815); Bodley v. Craig, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 1 (1808).
322
323

See In re Pa. Hall, 5 Pa. 204 (1847).
MCDERMOTT, supra note 86, at 40.
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make the system less democratic, they were also less likely to be accurate. As
the above examples show, some commissions were only six or seven members
large, about half the size of a traditional 12-person jury, and some allowed lessthan-unanimous decisions.
Modern research has revealed that both these features hurt the
decision-making process. Meta-analysis has found that larger juries tend to be
more diverse, better able to recall testimony, more deliberative, and more
consistent.324 Smaller juries perform more poorly and fail to achieve significant
cost savings, and virtually everyone who studies juries opposes reducing their
size.325 Allowing non-unanimity also cheapens deliberations by allowing
minority viewpoints to be disregarded.326
B. Courts Use New Doctrines to Shield Railroads from Juries
Today, it is a commonly accepted idiom that juries decide facts, and
judges decide the law. But at the founding, many believed that juries should have
unfettered power to make decisions without interference from judges. This meant
that juries could judge the law and facts, and even jury instructions were
resisted.327 There was a sound basis for resistance. In many jurisdictions, statutes
or constitutions, not mere tradition, gave juries the right to decide the law.328 The
military also gave jurors many powers that we now consider the province of the
judge.329 However, when juries did not take the same view of the law as the
judge, no one said they “nullified” the law. Rather, the jury was said to have
“interpreted,” “applied,” or “judged” the law differently, a reflection of the fact
that the jury was seen as competent to decide the law.330
Judges, however, started to encroach upon the power of juries. And in
the courtroom, the jury’s loss was the judge’s gain. The rise in judges’ power
stemmed from judicial dissatisfaction with how juries handled corporate
defendants.331 Courts used their newfound powers to correct juries’ supposed
errors, which usually meant helping railroads. They moved slowly at first. In
324

See Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 14 (1997); see also Michael J. Saks & Mollie Weighner
Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1997).
325
326

JONAKAIT, supra note 12, at 90–92.
See Saks, supra note 324, at 41–42.

327

Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 33, 44 (1990).
328

See, e.g., 1850 MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 25; 1818 ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 23; Com. v. Anthes,
71 Mass (5 Gray) 185, 185 (1855) (noting juries had the legal power to decide law and fact).
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE ARMY LAWYER: A HISTORY OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S
CORPS, 1775–1975, at 89 (1975).
329

330
331

HALE, supra note 156, at 61.
See Landsman, supra note 43, at 607.
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1836, the first court ruled that jury instructions were permitted but reassured the
parties that juries “undoubtedly have the power to” decide the law.332 In the
antebellum Midwest, jury instructions became a “frequent bone of contention in
appellate cases.”333 Around the country, judges started invalidating laws and
constitutional provisions that authorized juries to decide the law.334
Jury instructions, at least, still rested ultimate authority with the people.
The directed verdict, however, gave courts the power to decide an entire case
without ever impaneling a jury if the judge believed there was insufficient
evidence. Courts relied on new, pro-defendant doctrines to strip even more cases
away from the jury. Contributory negligence holds that if a plaintiff was even
1% responsible for their injury, they would be entirely barred from recovery.335
This doctrine was fueled by the belief that juries were incapable of deciding cases
fairly.336 The fellow servant rule held that the “master is not, in general,
responsible to his servant for injury sustained by the negligence of a
fellow-servant in the course of their common employment.”337 As a
consequence, judges who found a mote of error from the plaintiff or a coworker
could dispose of the case without ever bothering to submit it to a panel of citizens
for review.
Courts used the directed verdict power to protect railroads with gusto. In
one Massachusetts case, a woman crossed a track as a shortcut between
stations—a common practice at the station that the defendant did nothing to warn
against—and was struck by a train.338 The Supreme Judicial Court held that,
although the woman had a ticket, that did not entitle her to cut across the tracks
so she was a trespasser at the time of injury.339 It therefore affirmed the directed
verdict for the railway.340 There were plenty of other cases where courts reversed
jury verdicts because they did not believe there was sufficient evidence.341
Even children could not catch a break. Many young boys, drawn to train
engines like moths to a flame, were terribly injured while playing on the
machines. Juries routinely awarded compensation, and courts routinely reversed
them. In Illinois, a seven-year-old plaintiff brought a personal injury suit with
conflicting evidence: five men testified in support of the railroad, and two

332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341

McGowan v. State, 17 Tenn. (9 Yer.) 184, 195 (1836).
MCDERMOTT, supra note 86, at 47.
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 45, at 910–11.
Id. at 605–06. See, e.g., Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend. 376 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828)
Landsman, supra note 43, at 607.
Barstow v. Old Colony R. Co., 10 N.E. 255, 256 (Mass. 1887).
Johnson v. Boston & M.R.R., 125 Mass. 75, 77–78 (1878).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 79.
Jacobs v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 154 P. 1023, 1026 (Kan. 1916) (citing cases).
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children supported the plaintiff.342 Two separate juries trusted the children and
granted damages, but the courts thought they knew better.343 They parsed the
evidence to find for the railroad, with the state supreme court declaring “It was
no part of the duty of the company . . . to maintain a guard over it to warn
children from getting upon it or playing about it.”344 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas was more succinct. It started its opinion: “A railway company is not
bound to keep a lookout to prevent boys from swinging on the ladders of its
moving freight trains; and its failure to do so is not negligence,” and thus did not
bother to send the question to a jury in the first place.345 These were not
outliers.346
Railroad companies were even willing to fight relatively minuscule
verdicts. In Santora v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., the victim was a 27-monthold infant who found herself on the tracks of the defendant’s railway and was
struck.347 The jury awarded a verdict of $800, which even back in 1912 was not
much—around $20,000.348 It was still high enough to appeal, however, and the
court made it worth their while, reversing the paltry verdict because the toddler
was a trespasser.349
Contributory negligence proved exceedingly effective at reducing
corporate liability. At the beginning of the 20th century, industrial accidents
caused two million injuries and 35,000 deaths per year.350 Most of these were
never compensated.351 So effective were courts at rolling back juries that one
Pennsylvania state legislator said that judges were usurping jury rights “with the
stealthiness of a midnight assassin.”352

342
343
344
345

Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Stumps, 69 Ill. 409, 411 (1873).
See id. at 410, 414.
Id. at 414.
Catlett v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 21 S.W. 1062, 1062 (Ark. 1893).

346

See, e.g., Santora v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 98 N.E. 90 (Mass. 1912); Bjornquist v.
Boston & A.R. Co., 70 N.E. 53, 54 (Mass. 1904) (sustaining exceptions to a verdict in favor of an
eight-year-old plaintiff who injured himself playing on a train); Morrissey v. E. R. Co., 126 Mass.
377, 377 (1879) (“A railroad corporation is not liable for running over a child who is using the
track of the corporation as a playground, if the act is not done maliciously or with gross and
reckless carelessness.”); Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Smith, 9 N.W. 830 (Mich. 1881) (reversing a
jury verdict in favor of an eight-year-old plaintiff who injured himself playing on a train). Cf.
Rodgers v. Lees, 140 Pa. 475, 483 (1891) (applying the same logic to a case where a boy was killed
while playing in a mill).
347
Santora v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 98 N.E. 90 (Mass. 1912).
348

See Morgan Friedman, The Inflation Calculator, WESTEGG, https://westegg.com/inflation/
(last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
349
350
351
352

Santora, 98 N.E. at 91.
HANS, supra note 274, at 7.
Id.
MCDERMOTT, supra note 86, at 11.
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In order get around the Seventh Amendment’s admonition that “no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,”
courts had to create a legal fiction that when a judge permitted a putatively
deficient case to go to the jury, it was an error of law on the part of the judge,
which could be reversed without undoing the factual findings of the jury.353
Today, these tools are enshrined in rules of civil procedure.354
Much of this anti-jury sentiment was animated by concerns that
emotional jurors would deter business investment by making tort liability too
painful.355 Turns out that muzzling juries ended up deterring a different kind of
business investment: safety innovations.356 For example, efficient railway brakes
were invented in 1868, but because contributory negligence allowed them to
dodge liability for injuries, the industry did not have to adopt them until
legislation forced them to 20 years later.357
Century Branch Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Henigh358 shows the
mode of thinking that led to this underinvestment. A four-year-old child, named
Charles W. Henigh, wandered away from his mother, clambered onto a train car,
loosened the brake, fell off, and was crushed to death by it.359 The court admitted
that the death might have been avoided if the track was built level, or the lock
was securely fastened, but asked “what specific right had Charles W. Henigh to
say how said switch track should be constructed, or how said cars should be
fastened? None at all.”360 The jury found that the train track’s construction and
poor locks were negligent, but they too, apparently, lacked the right to tell the
company how to manage its own affairs, so the jury verdict for the plaintiff was
reversed.361
VI. LABOR INJUNCTIONS
The Seventh Amendment, which guarantees civil juries, only
“preserves” the right as it existed in 1789, which means it does not extend to
suits “in equity.”362 Suits of equity do not use juries and can seek injunctions that
353

Balt. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 658–59 (1935).

354

FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (judgment as a matter of law); FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (renewed motion
for judgment as a matter of law); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (summary judgment); FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (new
trial).
355
Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 33 (1990).
356
Id. at 70–71.
357
358
359
360
361
362

Landsman, supra note 43, at 608.
23 Kan. 347 (1880).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356, 358.
See id. at 358, 360.
EPPS, supra note 40, at 135.
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proscribe certain conduct as a remedy. Thus, juries cannot weigh in on
injunctions; it is a question for judges alone.363 Suits of law, in contrast, do use
juries and can impose money damages as a remedy. This distinction was used
time and time again to deny striking workers the right to a jury through equitable
injunctions.
A. First Strikes and the Rise of Labor Injunctions
Almost as soon as workers were brought together in factories, roughly
at the dawn of the 19th century, the law has been used to block collective
action.364 In the early days, unions were seen as criminal conspiracies to thwart
free trade. The shoemakers’ strike of the 1790s, which called for higher wages,
is an example.365 The striking workers were prosecuted for criminal conspiracy,
and the Philadelphia Mayor’s Court held the workers’ collective action violated
the employer’s right to pay whatever they wanted.366 In its charge to the jury, the
court was aghast at the notion of an equitable workplace. It said:
“Does this measure [to increase wages] tend to make good
workmen? No; it puts the botch incapable of doing justice to his
work on a level with the best tradesman. The master must give
the same wages to each. . . . Consider the effect it would have
upon the whole community. If the masters say they will not sell
under certain prices, as the journeymen declare they will not
work at certain wages, they, if persisted in, would put the whole
body of the people in their power.”367
Criminal conspiracy prosecutions became a popular response to
unions. The Massachusetts Supreme Court permitted businesses to sue unions
for persuading workers to quit and hindering company efforts to get
replacements.369 In addition to strikes, states passed laws to ban boycotts, and
prosecutors brought criminal actions against workers for inciting riots,
obstructing the streets, intimidation, and trespass.370 Prosecutions did not always
368

363

Id.

364

The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, CQ RESEARCHER (1929),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/document.php?id=cqresrre1928020400&type=hitlist&nu
m=0.
365
Deborah A. Ballam, Comment, The Law as a Constitutive Force for Change: The Impact of
the Judiciary on Labor Law History, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 128 (1994).
366
Ballam, supra note 365, at 128 (discussing Commonwealth v. Pullis (the Cordwainer’s
Case), 3 DOC. HIST. OF AM. IND. SOC. 59 (2d ed. Commons 1910)).
367
N. I. Gelman, Public Intervention in Labor Disputes, C.Q. RESEARCHER (1959),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresre1959012800.
368
Id.
369
370

Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871).
The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, supra note 364.
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go smoothly, however. When California tried to prosecute radical unionists,
juries typically refused to convict. Unhappy with these acquittals, the
government turned to injunctions.371 Where prosecutions had failed, injunctions
would succeed, for they did not require meddlesome jurors.
Injunctions provided a simpler way to accomplish the same end as
criminal prosecutions through the civil justice system. For this reason, courts and
employers came to prefer them as a more expedient alternative.372 Judges alone
got to decide whether a strike was lawful and thus could be enjoined.373
Injunctions sidestepped not only juries but also police and elected officials—
who often sided with labor at the time.374 As an added bonus, federal troops could
be called in to enforce injunctions.375
The first injunction to enjoin a strike was used in 1880 against
ironmolders, with the court holding that the strike was a trespass upon the rights
of the employer.376 But injunctions really took off after 1885. They were
extensively used to quell the Southwest railroad strike of 1886 and the practice
first attracted great public attention during a railroad engineers’ strike in 1888.377
To the strikers, it was as if a single judge could bring a halt to strike without even
hearing from anyone beyond the government or business. The absence of juries
in most cases endured as one of labor’s main objections to injunctions.378 Before
long, courts “came to look at much of organized labor’s economic coercive
activity as enjoinable in itself, without bothering to find or to state in their
opinions that it was also unlawful.”379
Undeterred, striking picked up steam, oftentimes motivated by meager
pay. In a miner strike during 1891, workers unionized to demand higher pay and
better support for sick and injured workers and prevented nonunion members
from mining until their demands were met.380 The court recoiled at the idea that
a mine could be “worked by such laborers, during such hours, at such wages, and
under such regulations, as the laborers themselves might direct.”381 The district
court ordered a continuing injunction. Indeed, the judge noted that when workers

371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378

JONAKAIT, supra note 12, at 77.
Ballam, supra note 365, at 128.
The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, supra note 364.
Ballam, supra note 365, at 142.
Id.
Murray T. Quigg, The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 3 LAB. L.J. 105, 106 (1952).
The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, supra note 364.
Id.

379

Gelman, supra note 367, at 3 (citations omitted).
Coeur d'Alene Consol. & Mining Co. v. Miners' Union of Wardner, 51 F. 260, 261–62
(C.C.D. Idaho 1892).
381
Id. at 263.
380
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tried to shut down a business, “courts have with nearly equal unanimity
interposed by injunction.”382
An 1893 strike by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers prompted
the company’s stockholders and creditors to file an injunction against the
company employees to enjoin them from not only interfering with the business
but also from quitting with or without notice.383 The company claimed it was
forced to cut wages—which prompted many workers to threaten the operation
of the railroad—by economic necessity.384 The court acknowledged the gravity
of the company’s ask, saying that “[t]here is no power, the exercise of which is
more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound discretion,
or is more dangerous in a doubtful case.”385 Nevertheless, it determined “a court
of equity should not hesitate to use this power when the circumstances of the
particular case in hand require it to be done in order to protect rights of property
against irreparable damage by wrongdoers,” and permitted the injunction.386
That was the last injunction to go so far as to prevent workers from quitting.387
B. Injunction Powers Grow
Soon, the Supreme Court would give its blessing to labor injunctions.
The Pullman strike of 1894 began in Chicago, led by Eugene Debs, involving a
refusal by workers to operate Pullman cars.388 President Grover Cleveland sent
in the Army, and the Attorney General sought an injunction against the
strikers.389 Not only was the injunction successful, but Debs was arrested for
violating the injunction and tried for contempt.390
The case made it up to the Supreme Court with Clarence Darrow
representing the workers.391 The case had the added twist of whether the federal
government could enforce an injunction without a jury. Answering in the
affirmative, the Court said that if the federal government had no other way to
382

Id. at 267.

383

Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 312–13 (7th Cir. 1894).
Id. at 314.

384
385
386

Id.at 328.
Id. at 328–29.

387

The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, supra note 364, at 2. In an 1897 case, however,
during a discussion of whether an engineer may suddenly quit without notice, the Supreme Court
did muse that “cases may be easily imagined where a sudden abandonment of a train load of
passengers in an unfrequented spot might imperil their safety, and even their lives.” Ex parte
Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 557 (1897). The implication is that perhaps, in some circumstance, a worker
could be prevented from quitting.
388
389
390
391

Quigg, supra note 376, at 107.
Id.
Id.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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enforce interstate commerce regulations than by prosecution and punishment,
“the whole interests of the nation in these respects would be at the absolute mercy
of a portion of the inhabitants of that single state.”392 Accordingly, “the strong
arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away all obstructions
to the freedom of interstate commerce,” juries included.393 But it denied there
was any infringement of jury rights since courts could determine on their own
whether a person was in contempt of an injunction.394 There was no dissent.
The Court expanded the power of injunctions in Ex parte Lennon.395
Locomotive workers for the Toledo, Ann Arbor & North Michigan Railway
Company threatened to stop working because the company hired non-union
members.396 A court issued an injunction stopping locomotive workers from
refusing to work.397 One of the workers, James Lennon, disobeyed the injunction,
and the court held him in contempt.398 He appealed, arguing that he had not been
a party to suit that issued the original injunction.399 The Court held that
injunctions could apply to people who were not parties to suits where the
injunction was issued and who had not received personal notice of it, as long as
they had actual notice.400 All the company had to do, therefore, was post notices
of the injunction around the workplace.401 Again, the decision was unanimous.
Around this time, injunctions expanded beyond strikes and began to be
used to stop boycotts as well. Based on the theory that employers had a right to
engage in business, courts used injunctions to thwart a national boycott of the
D.E. Loewe Company, started by the United Hatters Union.402 The Supreme
Court also prevented the American Federation of Labor from publishing an
article calling a company “unfair” or telling its members not to patronize it.403
And it even allowed injunctions to bar “peaceable persuasion” against
patronizing a business, calling such conduct just as bad as the use of force or
threats.404 Facing stiff opposition from the courts, boycotts quickly died out.405
392

Id. at 582.

393

Id.
Id. at 594–95.
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400
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Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 557 (1897).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 554.
Id.
Ballam, supra note 365, at 143; see also Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).

403

Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); see also Lawlor v. Loewe, 235
U.S. 522 (1915).
404
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Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 467–68 (1921).
Ballam, supra note 365, at 143.
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Injunctions kept chugging right along into the 20th century and labor
law became even less friendly to them as body blows from the courts kept right
on coming. In Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,406 the Court upheld an
injunction by a coal mine against union organizers who were not even employed
by the company.407 The organizers could be blocked from “interfering” with the
mine’s employees and trying to entice them to leave or join a union.408 In Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of North America,409 the
Supreme Court prohibited a stonecutters union from directing its worker not to
participate on projects that involved anti-union men.410 The union’s actions were
legal, they did not picket or boycott, nor did they threaten or deceive anyone.411
The Court enjoined them anyway.
C. Labor Injunction Legislation Brings Mixed Results for Unions and
Juries
Given the levels of judicial hostility, labor adjusted its strategy to curb
the power of the judiciary to enjoin its activities.412 The American Federation of
Labor drafted a bill to limit the use of injunctions and advocated for jury trials in
contempt cases.413 But for many years, these efforts were unsuccessful. Unions
managed to pass anti-injunction laws in a handful of states, but courts voided

406
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411

245 U.S. 229 (1917).
Id. at 262.
Id. at 261–62.
274 U.S. 37 (1927).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

412
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debated political issue. The Democratic Party announced its opposition to labor injunctions six
times in a row in its party platform between 1896 and 1916. 1896 Democratic Party Platform, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1896-democratic-partyplatform (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (decrying the “new and highly dangerous form of oppression
by which Federal Judges, in contempt of the laws of the States and rights of citizens, become at
once legislators, judges and executioners”); 1900 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1900-democratic-party-platform (last
visited Sept. 27, 2019); 1904 Democratic Party Platform, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1904-democratic-party-platform (last visited Sept.
27,
2019);
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Democratic
Party
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AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
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27,
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some of them and narrowly construed others.414 Meanwhile, industrial groups
were cooking up proposed legislation to prohibit strikes against government and
causing one company to pressure another, and the Bar Association proposed
eliminating strikes altogether.415
In 1914, the Clayton Act expanded the power of injunctions to forbid
not only striking but mass picketing.416 In what was called “the greatest industrial
struggle that ever occurred in America,” 400,000 railroad workers across the
nation mobilized a strike in 1922 to protest wage cuts and changes in work
rules.417 They rallied against pay cuts and changing work rules.418 At the behest
of President Warren Harding, Attorney General Harry Daugherty sought an
injunction against the strike, a court granted it, and 2,200 new federal marshals
were hired to enforce it.419 The injunction crushed the strike as workers were not
only barred from striking but also picketing and assembling near rail lines.420
The Norris–La Guardia Act of 1932421 was a rare victory for labor, as it
limited the use of labor injunctions, but did not eliminate them.422 This was made
painfully clear to unions in the next decade. After World War II ended, ten
million soldiers returned from combat, and unions started to make demands that
had been postponed during the war for the sake of national unity, leading five
million works to strike during the first few years of peacetime.423 John L. Lewis
led coal workers in 1946 to massive walkout to demand better wages; within a
few weeks, industrial production was crippled.424 Eventually, the government
and workers reached an uneasy armistice, known as the Krug–Lewis
agreement.425 The agreement broke down, the workers prepared to resume
striking, and the government sought an injunction, which was granted
immediately and without notice to the workers.426 The workers walked out

414
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anyway, and the government petitioned to have them held in contempt.427 Lewis
and the union were fined for contempt, and these punishments, though altered,
were upheld by the Supreme Court. 428
The Norris–La Guardia Act was also hobbled by other laws. The 1948
Taft–Hartley Act limited strikers’ right to jury trials in contempt cases arising
out of labor disputes.429 The government used the law to get eleven injunctions
in as many years.430 Unions repeatedly tried to have this right restored but
failed.431 And so labor injunctions continued. In 1959, steelworkers began
striking en masse: 85% of the nation’s steel mills closed their doors as hundreds
of thousands of workers left.432 The Justice Department, at the President’s
urging, sought an injunction to end the strike.433 After the district court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania ruled against the workers, and the Third Circuit
affirmed, the Supreme Court ended the strike in a brief per curiam opinion.434
Maybe the only time that unions fought against legislative jury rights
was during the debates over the 1957 Civil Rights Act. The law would have
provided for legal enforcement for voting rights violations, but it faced stiff
resistance from the southern segregationist wing of Congress.435 To placate them,
an amendment was proposed that would guarantee a jury trial for election
officials who refused to let black people vote.436 Because these juries would
probably be all-white, and therefore reliably let off election officials, they were
used to attract southern voters. To garner union support for the jury amendment,
a proposal was also floated to ease up Taft–Hartley, but union leaders refused,
saying “[l]abor will not barter away effective protection of the right of a Negro
to register and vote.”437 The law passed after Congress reached a compromise
that had jury trials enforce election laws, but allowed blacks to serve on them—
a meaningful new right.438
Over the years, companies found great success with injunctions. But
when workers tried to turn the tables, they were not so lucky. In 1980, workers
427
428
429
430

Id. at 267.
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sought an injunction against a steel company to prevent it from shuttering its
plant—and throwing 3,500 people out of work—after it promised to keep it open
as long it was profitable.439 The workers offered to buy and operate the plant
themselves, to no avail.440 The courts denied their claims and refused, this time,
to grant the injunction.441
When the layoffs were announced a few weeks before Christmas, the
town’s unemployment rate was 6.3%.442 Within two years of the plant closure, it
was 21%.443
VII.

CONCLUSION

As this Article has shown, in many times and many contexts, juries have
stood up for the lowly and against the powerful. Whether it was thwarting the
British crown, blocking recapture of runaway slaves, making railroads pay for
the harm they caused, or supporting workers over industry, they injected a muchneeded dose of humanity into the justice system.
This is as it should be. Echoing sentiments of past, Senator Shelton
Whitehouse said that “[t]he jury is intended to be a thorn in the side of the
powerful and wealthy. It is intended to make the powerful and wealthy stand
annoyingly equal before the law with everyone else.”444 If juries had been
empowered to decide all the above cases on their own, would the outcomes have
been different? It is possible that juries would have ruled the same way as the
undemocratic arbitrators throughout history.
Even if they did, a judgment of peers would have had greater legitimacy.
Judges, compared with jurors, are more likely to have attended private schools,
live in exclusive neighborhoods, and belong to private clubs.445 They “do not see
the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do
not see the awful court of judgment; they see only their own workshop.”446
439
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Jurors, compared with judges, are more likely to have struggled in
classes, experienced unemployment, felt the sting of poverty, seen the inside of
a prison, reflect the diversity of America, begrudged their jobs, staffed a
hazardous workplace, been victims of fraud, or borne the brunt unconstitutional
government activity.447 They have, in other words, suffered the mundane
indignities of life from which too many judges are insulated.
But to many, the humility of the jury is its fatal flaw. They see the
huddled masses as incapable of treating powerful parties fairly. A survey of
senior corporate executive found that a majority believed that “out of control”
juries giving excessive awards helped explain the high costs of litigation and hurt
America’ business competitive.448 Insurance companies run ad campaigns
claiming that high verdicts against them will result in higher rates.449 Businesses
fund advocacy groups that call for the diminution of juries.450 Those in power
see juries as hostile to them.
Scholars who research juries have reached the same conclusion. Valarie
Hans predicted “a civil justice system without a jury would evolve in a way that
more reliably served elite and business interests.”451 Douglas Smith said, “Both
judges and lawyers would fill the vacuum left by the erosion in the jury’s
power.”452 And Sandra Jordan wrote, “Elimination of the citizen jury would
effectively result in a transfer of power to the political and judicial elite.”453
History proves them right.
Today, many of the traditional jury functions have been taken away by
judges. This was partly driven by the professionalization of the bench. Judges
were once laymen themselves so they could not make any pretense of knowing
more than the jury.454 But it is also driven by the fact that many judges do not
think jurors are quite smart enough to handle the messy business of
self-government.455 In one case, the judge said that a jury made up of
447
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housewives, among others, could not be expected to understand complex
economic concepts, so he struck the demand for a jury trial.456 The ideas that a
judge schooled in law might not be able to comprehend economic concepts
either, or that a system of law too complex for ordinary people to ever understand
was too complex to be fairly applied, were not entertained.
This is unfortunate. Whatever the shortcomings of the juries, what are
they but a reflection of us all? If they are inadequate, we are inadequate. But their
continued use, despite the critics, shows that the meaning of justice is not the
exclusive domain of the lawyer or expert. It is something we all have a role in
shaping. America is essentially the last place on earth where juries are widely
used. We should be proud of this part of our heritage and slow to give it up.

jurors.”); Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1986) (“While the judge is in fact
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